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COURTS
Medical Malpractice: Limitations of Actions
CODE SECTIONS:
BILL NUMBER:
ACT NUMBER:
SUMMARY:
O.C.G.A. §§ 9-3-71 (amended) and 9-3-72
(amended)
SB 170
424
The Act amends the Code to provide a
two-year statute of limitations for medical
malpractice actions which runs from the
time of injury, rather than from the time
of the negligent or wrongful act or omis-
sion. The Act provides that all medical
malpractice actions must be brought within
five years of the negligent or wrongful act
or omission.
History
Prior law was subject to frequent attacks on due process and equal pro-
tection grounds. In 1982 the Georgia Supreme Court upheld this Code
section against allegations that a separate statute of limitations for medi-
cal malpractice was arbitrary and without any rational basis.1
However, in 1983 the Georgia Supreme Court invalidated O.C.G.A. § 9-
3-71 as applied to wrongful death actions because the statute created two
classes of claimants - "(1) those whose spouse, child or parent died
within two years of the negligent or wrongful act or omission, and (2)
those whose spouse, child or parent died more than two years after the
negligent or wrongful act or omission."2 The first class could maintain an
action while the second class was barred. The court found no rational
basis for these classifications.
In 1984 the court sustained an equal protection challenge to O.C.G.A.
§ 9-3-713 regarding personal injury claims. Where the injury arose more
than two years after the negligent act or omission an action was pre-
1. Allrid v. Emory Univ., 249 Ga. 35, 285 S.Et2d 521 (1982). See Hamby v. Neuro-
logical Assoc., 243 Ga. 698, 256 S.E.2d 378 (1979).
2. Clark v. Singer, 250 Ga. 470, 471, 298 S.E.2d 484, 486 (1983). (Clark dealt with a
different type of medical malpractice: a failure to make a pro'er diagnosis, rather than
foreign objects being left in a patient's body, as in Allrid.)
3. Shessel v. Stroup, 253 Ga. 56, 316 S.E.2d 155 (1984). See generally Thrash, Medi-
cal Malpractice and the Statute of Limitations: An Update on the Discovery Rule,
GA. ST, B.J,, Nov. 1985 at 60.
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cluded by the statute, but where the same injury occurred within two
years of the negligent act or omission, then an action could be brought.
The court held that, as in wrongful death actions, the statute of limita-
tions may not bar a course of action before the cause of action has arisen,
i.e., the injury has occurred. 4
SB 170
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71(a) provides a two-year statute of limitations which
runs from the date of injury rather than from the date of the negligent or
wrongful act or omission. The Act also creates a statute of ultimate re-
pose and abrogation 5 which stipulates that in "no event may an action for
medical malpractice be brought more than five years after the date on
which the negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred."'
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-72 states that O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71 does not apply to cases
in which a foreign object is left in a patient's body. Instead it provides
that a cause of action can be brought within one year from discovery of
the wrongful event. Foreign object does not include "a chemical com-
pound, fixation device, or prosthetic aid or device."
The Act does not revive any action barred by Title 9. Actions which
were not previously barred, but are barred by this Act are not barred
until July 1, 1986.1
4. Id. at 58, 316 S.E.2d at 158.
5. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71(c) (Supp. 1985).
6. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71(b) (Supp. 1985).
7. SB 170 (AP), 1985 Ga. Gen. Assem. § 3 (Section 3 was not codified. See O.C.G.A.
§ 9-3-73 (Supp. 1985) Editor's notes).
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